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Abstract   Linear programming-based models of individual multispecies
groundfish operations in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands area are developed
and applied to the question of determining efficient bycatches. The policy tool is
halibut quotas, which restrict the bycatch of halibut and also induce changes in
the target species catch composition and bycatch of other prohibited species. Ef-
ficient quotas can be interpolated from the locus of shadow values for discrete
halibut quotas relative to the opportunity cost of prohibited species bycatch in-
duced by the policy-set quotas on halibut bycatch. Because of information
limitations intrinsic to fisheries management, the efficient halibut quotas are
considered in the context of ranges of marginal value and marginal opportunity
cost developed using short- and long-run groundfish fishery models and stan-
dard error estimates of opportunity cost.
Key words   Multispecies fisheries, bycatch, programming model, Bering Sea/
Aleutian Islands, groundfish, halibut.
Introduction
One of the greatest challenges confronting managers of modern multispecies com-
mercial fisheries is the problem of bycatch of incidental species taken in conjunction
with species targeted by commercial fishermen. This problem varies considerably
with the nature of the fisheries stocks fished, type of gear used, time of year fished,
depth fished in the water column, species targeted, and skill of the fisherman,
among other things.
Unregulated bycatch in multispecies fisheries with relatively unselective gear,
such as trawls, can impose significant external costs on participants in other fisher-
ies in several ways. First and perhaps foremost, the incidental take of species such
as Pacific halibut or crab, which are highly valued as target species in other fisheries
and subject to overall catch quotas, reduces the quota available for the target fisher-
ies. The quality of product obtained from bycatches may be inferior, fetching a
lower market price than would be possible in a target fishery, or sale of incidental
catch may be prohibited entirely by discarding requirements that attempt to remove
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direct economic incentives to increase bycatch of high-valued incidental species.
Unregulated bycatch in multispecies fishery complexes may also have the undesir-
able consequence of prematurely closing other fisheries which also depend on some
minimal amounts of several species, because a catch quota for one species has been
reached. Finally, less selective gear can, in some cases, impact too heavily on
younger age cohorts of the stock, with the potential for damaging overall productiv-
ity of the stock.
Federal and state management agencies, in particular the regional Fishery Man-
agement Councils with jurisdiction over fisheries from 3 to 200 miles offshore, have
responded to these potential problems in a variety of ways. Time and area closures
are a common response that typically involve prohibiting the uses of some or all
fishing gear in sensitive locations such as nursery areas or during times of the year
when fish stocks may be unusually vulnerable to bycatch. Catch quotas, which re-
strict harvests by area or by gear type, are another common response.
Each of these mechanisms in principle balances the marginal benefit of in-
creased current harvest of a given species against foregone opportunity costs by an-
other gear group or by harvesters in a subsequent time period. It is generally recog-
nized that nowadays fisheries managers are in the allocation business, as many fish-
eries are quota constrained and fully utilized by American fishermen and processors.
When several species are harvested jointly, as is the case with many groundfish fish-
eries around the world, the problem of determining catch quotas or time and area
closures in a manner that might be even approximately optimal can be complex.
With the rapid changes in fleet size and configuration, and in the spatial and tempo-
ral distribution of fish stocks, that take place in many contemporary fisheries, even
if catch quotas can be considered optimal at one point they can quickly become out-
dated and burdensome without a responsive and rational means to adjust them.
In recent years there has been some effort to model the effects of fisheries poli-
cies on catch patterns in multi-species fisheries, both in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Is-
lands area and elsewhere. The Bering Sea Bycatch Model (Ackley; Smith and
Lloyd) has been used by fishery managers to help understand the consequences of
different management restrictions on the patterns of catch. This model uses the pat-
tern of catch by species, gear, area, and time in the most recent year to predict the
impact of time and area closures or designated catch limits. It accumulates catch
week by week for each fleet, time, and area, and fisheries or designated subareas are
closed when catch limits are reached or when time/area closures come into effect.
The model runs chronologically for the entire calendar year, and the cumulative
catches by time and area are then recorded for each management policy.
Several papers have presented estimates of fisheries production relationships us-
ing the dual approach. Squires (1987a,b) was among the first to apply modern dual
methods to the estimation of multiproduct technologies in New England fisheries.
Other examples of this parametric approach to technology measurement include
Dupont, Kirkley, and Strand, and Squires and Kirkley. More recently, Thunberg, et
al. have estimated product substitution relationships in the multi-species nearshore
fishery in Florida, and Campbell and Nicholl have estimated production technolo-
gies in purse seine and longline fisheries for tuna as part of considering the potential
benefits of reallocations of tuna among fleets.
This paper takes a somewhat different approach to the allocation of catch among
multispecies fisheries, motivated by the nature of the data available and the potential
for practical implementation in fisheries management. The purpose is to simulate ef-
ficient bycatch quotas for the groundfish fleet, which implies a comparison of mar-
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their target fisheries and the groundfish fishery.1 Mathematical programming models
of quasirent maximization for the catcher-processor fleet, using weekly data on indi-
vidual operations, are developed and solved for different levels of the policy tool of
interest, which is halibut bycatch quotas.2 By comparing the resulting marginal val-
ues of halibut used as bycatch in the groundfish fishery (given by the shadow value
on the constraint representing the halibut catch quota) to the opportunity costs of
bycatch associated with each level of halibut quota (including the bycatches of other
prohibited species induced by the changing halibut quotas), the “efficient” halibut
quota can be interpolated.
Given the marginal value of halibut corresponding to the efficient aggregate
quota, efficient quotas by time, area, and fishery can easily be determined without
having to explicitly estimate the multiproduct technologies at work in the fishery.
This can be a significant advantage because it is not always known which individual
vessels have similar technology and which are different (e.g., longline heading/gut-
ting for one market versus trawl roe or whole fish freezing operations for other mar-
kets, or combinations of these and others), so the researcher may have to make those
groupings to estimate a common technology, sometimes arbitrarily.
Uncertainties about the economic relationships used in fisheries policy analyses
are ubiquitous and stem from a number of sources. On the “demand” side of the
bycatch question, it is uncertain how much or how quickly groundfish fleets will re-
spond to changing catch quotas, particularly those for bycatch. On the “supply”
side, the opportunity costs of the bycatch, which make possible a multispecies fish-
ery, are not well known (though their key determinants can be identified). This pa-
per attempts to account for each of these types of uncertainties by assessing the
standard error of bycatch opportunity cost and by constructing two structural models
of the groundfish fleet response to halibut quotas. One is a short-term model where
the fleet size is fixed at the observed level and operations reduce their effort in re-
sponse to tightening bycatch quotas. The other is a long-run model where fleets can
adjust their capital stock and substitute fishing effort among times of the year.
Brief Description of Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fisheries
The groundfish complex of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands area is part of a remark-
ably rich and biologically productive ecosystem that is capable of generating sus-
tainable edible fisheries yields of over two million metric tons per year. While many
species of fish are present in the ecosystem, those capable of supporting major
groundfish fisheries consist of some eleven species categories—among them pol-
lock, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and several species of flatfish.
Among the many species taken incidentally in groundfish operations, six catego-
ries—halibut, herring, and two each of salmon and crab—support major fisheries in
their own right and comprise the most important external costs of the groundfish
fishery. These bycatch species are sometimes referred to as “prohibited species” be-
cause they may not be retained onboard if they are caught.
A number of distinct fleets target on various species in the groundfish group and
are distinguished by the gear they use (trawl, longline, or pot), whether they do any
1 It makes less sense to attempt to provide guidance on suboptimal quotas implied by inefficiencies in
the actual fishery, because the marginal values in question are highly dependent on the nature and extent
of the suboptimality. Quotas set in this manner might also tend to perpetuate inefficiencies rather than
reducing them.
2 A recent example of the programming approach is the paper by Squires, et al. simulating the effects of
Individual Transferable Quotas in the fixed gear sablefish fishery off the coasts of California, Oregon,
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on-board processing of their catch (catcher-processors do, catcher boats do not), the
target species pursued, and the product form produced from the catch. This paper fo-
cuses on the fleet of catcher-processor vessels which are typically larger, more self-
contained, and able to range longer and farther in pursuit of productive fishing. As
table 1 shows, this group of operators has accounted for three-quarters or more of
the total BSAI groundfish catch since 1990, the year when the BSAI groundfish
fishery became predominantly, and then exclusively, a domestic fishery.
Fish caught by the different gear types typically go into different product mar-
kets, and are accompanied by differing degrees and composition of bycatch. Pots
and longlines are used by catcher-processors nearly exclusively for Pacific cod in
the BSAI groundfish fishery, and each is a relatively low volume, but fairly selec-
tive, gear in terms of the target groundfish species; longline catches of target species
are 80% or more Pacific cod while pot catches are often over 95% cod. Trawl gear is
often used to target cod and many of the remaining species, and catch is typically
more mixed, especially from tows near or on the bottom.
For a number of years the federal government has maintained a system of on-
board observers to record the catch of both groundfish and prohibited species in the
BSAI fisheries, with coverage exceeding 90% of vessel-days in recent years.3 The
catch data used in this analysis are a blend of estimates from observer reports and
weekly reports filed by processors, which contain information on product forms and
weights from which raw catch weights and gross product value can also be esti-
mated. The catch data are reported by species, area, and week fished in 1992 for
each of some 130 catcher-processors. The predominant mode of fishing was trawl-
Table 1
Domestic Landings of Groundfish by Major Species in the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fisheries by Type of Processing, 1989–94
Landings in Thousand Metric Tons
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
All Groundfish
At-Sea 965.6 1,303.1 1,171.0 1,342.2 1,162.6 1,215.2
Shore-Based 219.5 284.9 303.2 443.7 423.8 443.5
Pollock
At-Sea 803.3 1,083.1 902.1 903.9 902.2 880.2
Shore-Based 190.4 247.3 266.1 414.8 381.2 386.0
Pacific Cod
At-Sea 96.2 126.9 127.3 152.4 100.3 121.4
Shore-Based 27.5 33.2 27.5 23.0 35.0 40.1
Flatfish
At-Sea 36.2 40.0 108.1 199.6 116.3 137.9
Shore-Based 0.9 2.1 7.2 4.4 6.0 15.5
Rockfish
At-Sea 7.2 25.0 6.4 16.4 12.5 12.7
Shore-Based 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Atka Mackerel
At-Sea 18.2 21.8 22.4 45.8 27.6 59.2
Shore-Based 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Source: Kinoshita, et al.
3 Only a small fraction of catch is sampled, however. In 1994, some 1,488 mt of the 2 million mt caught
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ing, though there were some thirty-five freezer longliners and five pot vessels repre-
sented in the data.
There has also been a systematic effort in recent years to collect more and better
information on the costs of fishing, through both formal surveys and informal dis-
cussions with groups of vessel owners. The National Marine Fisheries Service has
developed variable cost profiles for the different categories of vessels represented in
the catcher-processor data set, and each weekly observation on fishing activity also
has an estimate of variable costs along with fishing revenues. A description of the
methods which were used for estimating the time-dependent, catch-dependent, and
product weight-dependent variable costs can be found in Terry.
Producer Optimization and Fishery Manager Problems
Aggregate catch quotas are used extensively in BSAI groundfish management, both
for setting the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each groundfish species and for Prohib-
ited Species Catch (PSC) limits. All major fisheries are quota-constrained, and total
catch of groundfish and prohibited species is limited by biological concerns. Annually,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, in consultation with the North Pacific Fish-
ery Management Council, specifies the TACs and PSCs for individual species.
The process of annual quota setting can be described well by a mathematical
programming model. The model is based on the assumption that the observed data
on catch and cost are the result of profit-seeking choices by fishermen, in response
to constraints representing catch quotas given their production technology and the
management regime. Each operator is presumed to maximize variable profit or
quasirent from fishing operations, which consists of the weekly revenues from all
salable species, less variable costs of operation. The fishery manager is charged with
determining allocations among these fisheries that maximize net social benefit, tak-
ing account of the marginal values that quotas can generate in each fishery. The
overall social benefit optimization problem can thus be expressed as a two-stage op-
timization. The first stage, conditional optimization problem describes the indi-
vidual producer optimization given the quotas set by the fishery manager. The sec-
ond stage describes the setting of optimal quotas by the manager to maximize social
net benefit. These are referred to as the producer optimization model and the fishery
manager problem, respectively. Two versions of the producer optimization problem
are considered in this paper, corresponding to the short- and long-run fleet responses
to policies noted earlier. The short-run producer optimization problem and the corre-
sponding fishery manager problem are discussed and interpreted first, then the
modifications involved with constructing the long-run producer optimization prob-
lem are discussed.
Short-Run Producer Optimization Model
The short-run simulation model presumes that the policies set by the management
authority have effects only on the existing fleet of catcher-processors. In response to
progressively tighter policies on halibut bycatch, the proportion of weekly effort by
each catcher-processor relative to actual effort is bounded on the interval [0, 1] to
reflect the fact that in the very short-run, there is little or no opportunity to modify
fishing strategies from what was actually recorded in the data observed. It is pos-
sible to fish less intensively than the actual effort level in a given week, but not
more intensively.
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ing salable groundfish species and j = m + 1, ..., n representing the bycatch species.
The production technology for operator i in fishery k during week w is
Tiw
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From the standpoint of society as a whole, the maximum short-run benefits from
fishery k result from having only the most efficient, or highest quasi-rent, operations
participate. This maximum quasi-rent π k(Qk) from fishery k is the result of choosing
weekly participation  Iiw
k , with 0 ≤   Iiw
k  ≤  1, for a given set of catch quotas Qk; i.e.,
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with non-negativity constraints on  Iiw
k , the constraints, and shadow values. The
quasi-rent  π iw
k  and multi-species catch vector qiw
k  from operation i in fishery k dur-
ing week w are the basic elements of the mathematical programming approach to de-
termining optimal catches. They are taken as parametric in equation (1), along with
the aggregate quotas Qj
k  for each species j in fishery k, which are the policy tools.
As a result, the technology parameters αα iw
k  are not estimated directly as part of the
model, since they are subsumed within the π iw
k . We refer to this as a nonparametric
approach because the model yields marginal valuations of aggregate quotas without
estimating the underlying production technology. It also means that the model esti-
mates are conditional on production technology remaining fixed, and on other fac-
tors taken as given, such as product and factor market prices.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions from the problem in equation (1) imply that
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Equations (2)-(4) define the threshold on weekly quasirent in fishery k for operation
i to be included in the efficient fishery solution.4 The shadow value vj
k(Qk) ≡
4 Second order conditions on curvature of the marginal value and opportunity cost functions must also
be met. Sufficient conditions are that the marginal value of bycatch in the multispecies fishery be non-
increasing and the opportunity cost be non-decreasing in the quota level.Toward Efficient Multispecies Bycatch 187
∂ Sk/∂ Qj
k  is the marginal increase in annual social net benefit resulting from a small




j ∑  is the marginal increase
in social net benefit from the catch resulting from i’s operation in week w. Condi-
tions (2) and (3) indicate that operation i’s quasi-rent (or increment to net social
value) must equal or exceed this social valuation of the catch for i to participate that
week; condition (4) says that vessels which are less efficient and have lower quasi-
rent are excluded.
Fishery Manager Problem
The fishery manager’s allocation problem is to determine quotas Qk for all fisheries
to maximize social net benefit, subject to biological limits on acceptable catch lev-
els, so that  k ∑ Qk ≤  TAC, where TAC ≡  (TAC1, …, TACn) is the vector of Total Al-
lowable Catches of species 1 through n.
Formally, the fishery manager wishes to determine allocations Qk to fisheries
1, ..., K to
max
Qk S =  k ∑ Sk(Qk) +  j ∑ φ j[TACj –  Qj
k
k ∑ ] (5)
given Sk(·) determined from equations (1)-(4) for each fishery. Recalling that the
partial derivative of social value of quota Qj
k  in fishery k is ∂ Sk/∂ Qj
k  = vj
k(Qk), the
necessary conditions for a maximum of equation (5) include
vj
k(Qk) = φ j   for Qj
k  > 0 (6)
Qj
k  = 0   for vj
k(Qk) < φ j (7)
φ j = 0   for  Qj
k
k ∑  < TACj (8)
Qj
k
k ∑  = TACj   for φ j > 0 (9)
for all k = 1, ..., K and j = 1, ..., n. Equation (6) shows that for fisheries with positive
catch quotas for species j, the marginal social benefit of catch should be equated
across all fisheries at a level of φ j, which represents the marginal social benefit from
increasing the TAC of that species. At the optimum, φ j also represents the marginal
social opportunity cost of a reallocation of one unit of quota away from each fishery.
Fisheries with marginal social benefit of less than φ j should receive zero quota of
species j, according to equation (7).
Note that equations (1)-(5) cover both quota-constrained species and species
which are underutilized due to market or other conditions. For species that are not
quota-constrained, φ j = 0 in equation (8), which in turn implies vj
k = 0 for all k and
TACj >  Qj
k




w k i ∑ ∑ ∑ ; that is, the harvest of species j in all fisheries is
less than the total amount which can be safely harvested from a biological stand-
point, and individual fishery quotas of species j are set so that they do not constrain
the harvest of other species. Quota-constrained fisheries satisfy equation (9), with
positive shadow values φ j.
Fisheries that target almost exclusively on one species but unavoidably take
small amounts of another species are also covered by equations (1)-(5). An example
is the BSAI longline fishery for sablefish, which takes relatively small amounts ofLarson, House, and Terry 188
halibut. The marginal value of halibut is extremely high in this fishery because it
makes possible the harvest of substantial amounts of sablefish with high social
value. Thus the case can easily be made for setting quotas of incidental species for
nearly every fishery to allow for normal variations in catch patterns without disrupt-
ing the harvest.
For a given halibut PSC quota and TAC limits on groundfish catches, the
shadow values φ j on the TAC and halibut PSC constraints guide the allocation of
catch between fisheries [equations (6)-(9)] and between vessel weeks within a fish-
ery [equations (2)-(4)]. The model finds the set of vessel-weeks that jointly maxi-
mize equations (1) and (5).
In so doing, it determines the optimal activity of each vessel in the fleet
throughout the year: the alternatives for each vessel in a given week are (i) to not
fish; (ii) to fish the whole week, with the resulting catch, cost, and quasirent being
the same as in the actual data; or (iii) to fish some fraction of the week, with propor-
tional results in terms of catch, cost, and quasirent.
While this model is intuitive and straightforward to implement, it is restrictive.
The weekly vessel cost function implied by the linear programming embodies
Leontief technology. In one sense this may not be completely unreasonable given
the level of temporal resolution in this analysis, because during a given week vari-
able factor proportions may be approximately fixed. However, the short-run model
does not address substitution among inputs and outputs that will occur as areas and
times fished respond to management changes. The long-run model described next
does allow for some limited substitution of fishing effort among times and areas.
Long-Run Model
The purpose of doing the two sets of simulations (plus an intermediate case which is
an average of the two) is to provide plausible bounds on the efficient halibut bycatch
quotas. In the short-run model just described, cutbacks in halibut quotas require the
existing fleet to fish less, with the consequence that the TACs of some groundfish
species are not fully taken. This would tend to overstate the marginal value of hali-
but to the groundfish fishery, because in reality fishermen would adjust their fishing
strategies in response to tightening halibut quotas to still take all the groundfish
fishery TACs, at least for moderate halibut quota reductions. Similarly, the long-run
simulation plausibly underestimates the efficient halibut quota, because it presumes
more adjustment toward efficiency in fishing operations, and a lower marginal value
of halibut to the groundfish fishery, than can actually occur in the near term.
The long-run model allows for the number of vessels in the fleet and their fish-
ing patterns to differ from what was observed in the actual fishery data. The pre-
sumption is that the actual harvest and quasirent data reflect a continuum of opera-
tions that reflect a number of different harvesting/processing technologies, as well
as differing degrees of efficiency in operation because of differences in length of
time in the relatively-new domestic BSAI groundfish fisheries, access to markets,
and the like. As operators gain experience, they will make the necessary changes in
operations to mimic those in the fleet which are most efficient at their particular
combinations of fisheries. Some operations target exclusively on one fishery for the
entire year, while others participate in several fisheries, targeting on different spe-
cies at different times of the year and ending up catching some amounts of every
major groundfish species. The most efficient operators define multispecies effi-
ciency frontiers toward which the long-run fishery would evolve, given time and ev-
erything else (prices, species distribution, and abundance) constant. The program-
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in response to changing bycatch management policy by analyzing a fleet composed
only of the most efficient operations present in the actual data. This can be thought
of as a fairly crude comparative statics exercise as the configuration of the fleet
changes toward that represented by the most efficient operations in the fleet, with all
else (prices, factor costs, abundance, and catch conditions) held constant.
The long-run model thus takes each catcher-processor’s annual fishery partici-
pation pattern as an observation on the technology used, and selects the combination
of technologies that maximize quasi-rents, allowing for replication. This may be a
reasonable depiction of the long-run fishery if there exists in the actual data at least
one operation of each technology type that can be considered optimal with respect to
processing plant, catching capacity, and other factors that are normally considered
fixed in the short-run. To the extent that this is not true, the “long-run” case consid-
ered here will describe improvements in efficiency but not necessarily describe the
long-run.
A fundamental difficulty in many fisheries is that fixed costs are not well
known, especially on a vessel-by-vessel basis. This can substantially complicate
modeling of the long-run fishery. This paper pursues an alternative approach to
modeling the long-run in the absence of fixed cost information, based instead on
long-run marginal costs. If at least some of the vessels in the existing fleet are pre-
sumed to have optimal plant size, their marginal costs of operating are an approxi-
mation to long-run marginal cost. If it can be assumed that vessels are not in long-
run equilibrium and have plant size that is smaller than optimal, then their marginal
costs of operation will be higher than for those in long-run equilibrium, and their
short-run quasirents will be lower. Thus under these circumstances, a means of iden-
tifying the long-run efficient operations is that their short-run quasirents are higher.
By allowing the most efficient (highest-quasirent) operations to be “reproduced”
at will to maximize quasirents subject to catch constraints, a change in the structure
of the fleet which may approach the long-run configuration is induced. In determin-
ing the most efficient operations, the entire year’s pattern of participation in all
Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) groundfish fisheries is considered, on the
grounds that the efficient operations will participate in a portfolio of fisheries
throughout the year to spread their (unobserved) fixed costs. If such long-run effi-
cient operations exist in the data set, their observed participation pattern will ap-
proximate the long-run participation pattern. This eliminates absurd outcomes such
as a manifold increase in fleet size with each vessel fishing only a week or two,
which could happen based on simulating maximum quasirents for individual fisher-
ies without considering fixed costs or the pattern of fishing throughout the year to
spread them.
Formally, the long-run model is
Lk(Qk) ≡   max
Ii
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which differs from equation (1) in the definition of, and constraints upon, the par-
ticipation index. The fishery manager problem is identical to equation (5) with the
exception that Lk(Qk) from equation (10) is used instead of Sk(Qk).
Efficient Bycatches in the BSAI Groundfish Fisheries
The short- and long-run models were implemented using data on catcher processors
operating in the BSAI area during 1992. The focus is on halibut bycatch quotas be-
cause halibut bycatch is a significant concern in North Pacific fisheries. Proposals toLarson, House, and Terry 190
limit halibut bycatch in various ways (e.g., through time/area closures of known
nursery areas) are already institutionalized in North Pacific fisheries management,
and further proposals to limit halibut bycatch have been made to the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council recently.
The data available for our analysis consist of weekly cost, revenue, and catch by
vessel in the groundfish fisheries, but we do not have corresponding detail for the
fisheries which are impacted adversely by halibut removals in the groundfish fish-
ery. Thus, the empirical analysis uses the models in equations (1)-(10) to determine
the marginal value of halibut to the BSAI groundfish fisheries. This information is
then compared to opportunity costs which are assessed outside the model based on a
standard methodology used for these fisheries.
The short-run [equations (1) and (5)] and long-run [equations (1) and (10)]
models for halibut marginal value are linear programming models which operate on
individual vessel-weeks during the season. These data represent a total of 3,136 ac-
tivities by the fleet of 130 groundfish catcher/processors, subject to aggregate catch
constraints for ten groundfish species (Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, rock sole,
Greenland turbot, yellowfin sole, other flatfish, midwater pollock, bottom pollock,
rockfish, and sablefish) which are fixed at the levels of actual 1992 catch throughout
the analysis.5 The eleventh aggregate catch constraint, halibut quotas, is the policy
tool which is varied systematically to ascertain how the marginal value of halibut to
the groundfish fishery varies with the level of quota allocated.
Marginal Value and Opportunity Cost of Halibut in the Groundfish Fishery
If Qh
1 is the quota of halibut allocated to the BSAI groundfish fishery, then the mar-
ginal value of halibut to that fishery (the inverse derived demand for halibut in the
groundfish fishery) is given by the shadow value vh
1(Qh
1) on the PSC constraint for
halibut in equation (1). The conditions for optimal allocation of halibut in (6)-(9) re-
quire that this marginal value be equal to the marginal value of halibut in other fish-
eries, including the longline fishery that targets on halibut.6
To assess the marginal value of halibut to the groundfish fishery, the short- and
long-run models were solved repeatedly using GAMS (Brooke, et al.) with TAC
constraints for catch of groundfish species held constant and the halibut PSC quota
(catch constraint) varying from 500 mt to the level at which the marginal value of
halibut goes to zero, in increments of 60 mt. Halibut quota was taken as the only
policy instrument, with the catches of other prohibited species allowed to vary
freely.7 Changes in the shadow value vh
1(Qh
1) corresponding to each level of halibut
quota provide a fairly detailed picture of how marginal value of halibut varies with
the quantity of halibut bycatch in the groundfish fishery. This is the inverse derived
demand for halibut by the groundfish fleet.
Figure 1 depicts these relationships for the short- and long-run models, and for
an “intermediate-run” model. This was constructed for comparison because of the
5 Two groundfish categories, arrowtooth flounder and other groundfish, are not constrained in the model,
because they are not tightly constrained in the annual quota-setting process by NMFS and the Council.
The TACs for other species are fixed by biological considerations.
6 In reality there are many groundfish fisheries which take some halibut incidentally; at the optimum
allocation of halibut PSC among these fisheries, the marginal value of halibut should be equal across all
fisheries, including the target halibut fishery. Determining optimal quotas for different groundfish fish-
eries is discussed further below.
7 By specifying quotas for all prohibited species and varying individual bycatch quotas with all other
bycatch and TACs held constant, one can trace out the inverse demand system for all bycatch species
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likelihood that the short- and long-run model marginal values are biased upward and
downward, respectively, as discussed earlier. It is simply the mean of marginal val-
ues produced by the short- and long-run models.
The other piece of information needed for determining optimal quotas is the
marginal opportunity cost of the bycatch induced by the policy instrument. The op-
portunity cost of bycatch is calculated using a standard methodology used for this
purpose in North Pacific fisheries regulatory analyses, based on work by Marasco
and Terry. Though simple, this methodology provides a rough estimate of the fore-
gone net revenues in the target fisheries for prohibited species as a consequence of
their taking in the BSAI groundfish fisheries instead. This methodology is currently
used in North Pacific policy analyses (e.g., Terry).
The estimates of foregone net revenues for each species are based on wholesale
prices in the target fishery for each prohibited species, scaled by three factors: the
yield loss (foregone catch in the target fishery as a result of incidental capture at an
earlier age in the groundfish fishery); the product recovery rate from catch to whole-
sale products; and the fraction of the gross wholesale value that represents
quasirents (total revenue less variable costs of production). The unitless scale fac-
tors act as a multiplicative constant to convert a unit of PSC in the groundfish fish-
ery to a unit of net wholesale product foregone (yield loss factor · recovery rate ·
net/gross value ratio), and the price converts to monetary value. Table 2 lists these
factors for each prohibited species, along with the implied point estimate of net rev-
enues foregone per mt of catch. The estimates for halibut reflect differences in the
yield loss factor due to different size compositions of halibut taken by the various
gear types.
A nonparametric estimate of opportunity cost can be made given the data on
catches of other prohibited species corresponding to each level of halibut quota. An
increase in halibut quota represents not only an increase in halibut foregone (be-
cause outputs are typically joint), it will also represent a change in the amount of
Figure 1.  Marginal Values of Halibut Quota to the Groundfish Fishery and Marginal
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other prohibited species foregone that imposes a cost on the fisheries for those spe-
cies as well. The marginal opportunity cost of other species could be positive or
negative, depending on whether halibut is complementary or substitute in produc-
tion with those species. The opportunity cost estimate is nonparametric because the
production relationship between halibut and other prohibited species is not esti-
mated; interval estimates are made based on the programming model solutions.
An interval estimate of the marginal change in catch of prohibited species k
(where k = 1, ..., 6 to denote halibut, herring, red king crab, bairdi tanner crab,
chinook salmon, and other salmon) per mt of halibut quota (H) is simply half the
difference in the catch of k for the next highest and next lowest levels of halibut
quota, expressed on a per-ton of halibut basis. Expressed as a formula, dPSk(H)/dH
= (1/60){[PSk(H + 60) – PSk(H – 60)]/2}. The nonparametric estimate of opportunity
cost of halibut catch is then
OCH = a1p1 +  k= ∑ 2
6
 akpk(dPSk/dH)( 1 1 )
where ak are the scale factors and pk are wholesale prices of the prohibited species
caught in their target fisheries.
One can use equation (11) to help assess the plausible range of opportunity
costs of halibut, for comparison with the range of marginal values of halibut in the
groundfish fishery. The key determinant of opportunity costs, and the one which is
likely most volatile, is the market prices p ≡  [p1, ..., p6] of halibut and the other pro-
hibited species in their target markets. Another determinant is the marginal prohib-
ited species catch per unit of halibut quota change, which will vary with the levels
of catch of all species. Prices are likely to be correlated, and the marginal PSCs are
also likely to be correlated because they are linked through the technology. How-
ever, changes in groundfish fishery PSCs over the ranges considered here are un-
likely to have any market price effects for those species, so prices are taken to be
uncorrelated with the marginal PSCs. If the scale factors are taken as constant,8 this
Table 2
Factors Used in Assessing the Opportunity Cost of
Prohibited Species in the BSAI Groundfish Fisheries
Yield Loss Recovery Net/Gross Scale Wholesale Net Revenue/
Species Factor Rate Value Factora Price ($/lb.) Unit Catch
Halibut
Longline 1.09 0.75 0.53 0.43 1.45 $1,385/mt
Pot 1.05 0.75 0.53 0.42 1.45 1,334/mt
Trawl 1.69 0.75 0.53 0.67 1.45 2,148/mt
Herring 0.88 1.00 0.51 0.45 0.62 614/mt
Bairdi Tanner 0.76 0.47 0.39 0.14 3.30 0.46/crab
Red King Crab 3.50 0.57 0.46 0.92 9.85 9.04/crab
Chinook Salmon 13.20 0.77 0.58 5.90 3.95 23.29/fish
Other Salmon 4.20 0.77 0.58 1.88 1.16 2.17/fish
a Scale Factor is the product of Yield Loss Factor, Recovery Rate, and Net/Gross Value.
8 The scale factors ah and ak are treated as constants in the standard opportunity cost analyses, which is a
simplification. However, their variation is probably small relative to that of prices and marginal PSCs,
and there is little empirical data available on yield loss factors, product recovery rates, or wholesale
profit margins to gauge their contribution to the marginal opportunity cost of halibut quotas.Toward Efficient Multispecies Bycatch 193
means the variance of marginal opportunity costs of halibut can then be expressed in
terms of the random wholesale prices and the random marginal prohibited species
catches. Using equation (11), this is
var(OCH) =  ′ SQΩΩΩΩΩ pSQ +  ′ SpΩΩΩΩΩ QSp (12)
where  ′ SQ ≡  [a1, a2 · dPS2/dH, …, a6 · dPS6/dH],  ′ Sp ≡  [a1 p1, …, a6 p6], ai is the scale
factor for species i,  pi  is the mean of price i, and ΩΩΩΩΩ p and ΩΩΩΩΩ Q are the variance-cova-
riance matrices of wholesale prices and of marginal PSCs, respectively.
To compute equation (12), wholesale prices for the six prohibited species over
the period 1990–94 were obtained and their variance-covariance matrix ΩΩΩΩΩ p was cal-
culated. An empirical estimate of the variance-covariance matrix ΩΩΩΩΩ Q of marginal
PSCs was constructed from the data series on prohibited species catches for each of
the halibut quotas. The vector  ′ SQ was constructed for each of the point estimates of
dPSk/dH that varied with the level of H considered, and  ′ Sp was constructed using
the wholesale price estimates for 1991–92 for each species. Then upper and lower
estimates of OCh (MocHigh and MocLow in figure 1) were constructed as the point
estimate of OCh, plus or minus two standard deviations.
When the marginal value and marginal opportunity cost of halibut quota are
compared in figure 1, several points can be made.9 The first point is that under cur-
rent prices and biological conditions in the fishery, the marginal value of halibut as
bycatch in the groundfish fishery is high relative to opportunity cost for the short-
run and intermediate models. Second, the slopes of the short- and long-run models
exhibit the relationships one expects based on the LeChatelier principle: the less-
constrained, long-run quasirent function has less curvature in the halibut quota vari-
able than does the short-run model, which implies a flatter slope of marginal value
(marginal quasirent) with respect to halibut quota. The short- and intermediate-run
marginal value relationships indicate the marginal value of halibut to the BSAI
groundfish fleet rises fairly rapidly with reductions in halibut quotas.
 Third, the long-run marginal value curve suggests the possibility that under
more efficient configurations or higher prices for the prohibited species in their tar-
get fisheries, the BSAI groundfish fishery could operate with substantially lower
halibut quotas, of as little as 2,000 mt. The long-run marginal value of halibut is be-
tween the high and low marginal opportunity cost estimates for halibut quotas be-
tween roughly 1,940 and 4,200 mt, approximately equaling the point estimates of
OCh over that range. It seems plausible that the long-run model marginal value is a
lower-bound estimate, though opportunity cost could also be understated given the
simple methodology used for its calculation.
Industry Structure in the Short- and Long-Run Models
One can gain a perspective on the differences between the short- and long-run model
solutions by looking at the fleet composition and temporal pattern of participation
for each. Figure 2 plots participation data (number of catcher-processors fishing) by
statistical week. Here too, some interesting patterns emerge. In the actual fisheries,
the heaviest participation was in the period from early June to early September. The
intermediate model and short-run models, which are indistinguishable from each
9 The relationships between catch of halibut and other prohibited species differ somewhat between the
short- and long-run scenarios for the groundfish fishery, so the marginal opportunity costs of groundfish
harvest differ slightly between the two scenarios. To avoid cluttering figures 1 and 2, only the long-run
marginal opportunity cost is shown.Larson, House, and Terry 194
other in terms of participation patterns, have systematically lower participation than
the actual fisheries, consistent with the logic of the short-run model (which the in-
termediate model mimics) that weekly effort by the existing fleet is reduced in re-
sponse to tighter halibut quotas. The quasirents earlier in the year are higher, how-
ever, probably due to a combination of both abundance and price factors, so the ef-
fort pattern shifts noticeably in the long-run model, toward the January-March pe-
riod and away from latter months of the year. The total fleet operating at any time is
slightly larger in the long-run fishery for 1992 as compared with the short-run fish-
ery (a maximum of 107 catcher-processors in any given week versus 100).
Comparing the actual and long-run fleets gives a sense for the degree of struc-
tural change that is implicit in the long-run fishery solution. (The short-run and in-
termediate models are omitted for brevity as they are qualitatively similar to the ac-
tual fishery.) The actual fishery (table 3) was organized into groups of operations
based on the primary target species pursued by each operation, as measured by the
number of weeks in which that species was the dominant one in the catch composi-
tion. Using this classification, the operations using pot or longline gear in the actual
fishery are straightforward to characterize. The longline fishery (fifty-seven opera-
tions) consisted of two modes of operation, one that targeted Pacific Cod almost ex-
clusively (roughly 85% of the longline fleet) and another that targeted sablefish al-
most exclusively. The pot fleet was a small number of operations (nineteen) that tar-
geted Pacific cod exclusively. The trawl fishery consisted of some seventy opera-
tions, and by its nature is highly mixed in terms of species targeted; many opera-
tions target different species throughout the course of the year. The two main target
Figure 2.  Number of Catcher-Processors by Week, 1992 BSAI Groundfish Fishery
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species were yellowfin sole and pollock, with smaller numbers of operations pursu-
ing rock sole and Pacific cod as primary target species. The total number of catcher-
processors is 130, less than the sum across all gear types because a number of opera-
tions use multiple gear.
The long-run model solution (table 4) selects a small number of individual,
multi-species operations as the efficient modes, and replicates them to build a fleet
that maximizes quasirents. There are no pot operations and thirty-five longline op-
erations targeting Pacific cod almost exclusively in the model solution. Two longline
Table 3
Weeks Spent Targeting on Major Species in the Actual 1992
BSAI Groundfish Fishery, by Primary Target Species and Geara
Primary Target Species
Pollock Pacific Pollock Rock Yellowfin
Bottom Cod Pelagic Sole Sablefish Sole
Gear Species (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) Totals
Longline
Atka Mackerel 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pacific Cod 21.58 1.00 1,086.00
Pollock Bottom 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pollock Pelagic 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rockfish 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rock Sole 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sablefish 0.30 16.71 132.00
Yellowfin Sole 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total weeks 21.94 18.00 1,223.00
No. of processors 50 7 57
Pot
Atka Mackerel 0.00 0.00
Pacific Cod 10.05 191.00
Pollock Bottom 0.00 0.00
Pollock Pelagic 0.00 0.00
Rockfish 0.00 0.00
Rock Sole 0.00 0.00
Sablefish 0.00 0.00
Yellowfin Sole 0.00 0.00
Total weeks 10.11 192.00
No. of processors 19 19
Trawl
Atka Mackerel 1.09 0.14 0.68 1.33 0.00 3.12 113.00
Pacific Cod 5.36 3.86 0.86 2.67 0.00 2.27 172.00
Pollock Bottom 11.09 0.29 3.09 1.33 0.00 1.50 235.00
Pollock Pelagic 5.00 0.00 16.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 449.00
Rockfish 0.73 0.71 0.14 1.33 0.00 2.19 77.00
Rock Sole 0.82 1.71 0.00 7.33 0.00 3.54 135.00
Sablefish 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00
Yellowfin Sole 3.45 0.57 1.59 3.67 0.00 16.15 508.00
Total weeks 28.00 7.29 22.64 20.33 1.00 30.81 1,721.00
No. of processors 11 7 22 3 2 26 71
a The actual number of processors is 130; seventeen fished with more than one gear type.Larson, House, and Terry 196
modes are evident: one group of thirteen vessels that fishes some thirty-one weeks
of the year, and a second, larger group (twenty-two vessels) that fishes only about
eleven weeks per year. Nearly all of the Pacific cod TAC is taken by these longline
operations. Trawl operations consist of a pollock-only mode (five vessels), two yel-
lowfin sole-rock sole modes (twenty vessels), a pollock-Pacific cod mode (sixteen
vessels), and two other multispecies modes with yellowfin sole as the primary target
species (thirty-one vessels). This represents a total of some seventy-two trawl opera-
tions, nearly identical to the actual 1992 trawl fleet size.
Participation and Quasirents
The distribution of participation by the groundfish fleet across target fisheries, irre-
spective of gear used, and the resulting quasirents, is given in table 5. These results
are consistent with a priori expectations: the total quasirents in the aggregate short-
run and intermediate-run models are modestly higher than quasirents in the actual
fishery, and the long-run quasirents are substantially higher: some $503 million for
the long-run fishery, versus $377 million in the actual fishery. Similarly, aggregate
participation (measured by processor-weeks) is largest in the actual fishery, and de-
clines as the length of run of the simulation model increases. Fishery-by-fishery re-
sults vary somewhat, as expected because of the jointness of the BSAI fishery pro-
duction, but most individual target fisheries also exhibit the patterns found in the ag-
gregate results.
Table 4
Weeks Spent Targeting on Different Species in the Simulated
1992 Long Run Fishery, by Fishing Strategy/Technology and Gear
Type of Fishing Technology and Targeting Strategy
Lgl1 Lgl2 Trawl1 Trawl2 Trawl3 Trawl4 Trawl5 Trawl6
Gear/Species (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) (Weeks) Totals
Longline
Pacific Cod 30 11 640.48
Sablefish 1 0 13.24
Total weeks 31 11 653.71
No. of
processors 13.24 22.13 35.36
Trawl
Atka Mackerel 3 0 0 1 0 3 105.90
Pollock Bottom 1 6 0 0 6 1 154.84
Pacific Cod 0 0 0 0 4 4 181.14
Other Flatfish 2 0 0 1 0 1 45.65
Rockfish 0 0 0 3 0 2 98.22
Pollock Pelagic 1 18 0 0 10 8 480.48
Rock Sole 3 0 5 7 0 0 130.96
Yellowfin Sole 23 0 10 15 0 11 624.45
Total weeks 33 24 15 27 20 30 1,821.63
No. of processors 1.57 4.71 6.80 13.18 15.95 29.34 71.54Toward Efficient Multispecies Bycatch 197
Determining Bycatch Quotas by Fishery
The determination of efficient quotas by fishery or other criteria (such as time and
area) is straightforward, given the solutions to the efficiency-maximizing program-
ming problems. If the marginal value of quota is decreasing in the level of quota, as
assured by the second-order sufficient conditions, equation (6) can be inverted to
solve for the optimal quotas for each fishery,
Qk = vjk j
– () 1 φ . (13)
Thus, with an empirical estimate of the marginal value φ j, the quotas for all fisheries,
times, and areas using species j can be determined immediately from equation (13).
Table 6 presents “efficient” halibut quotas by target fishery and gear type im-
plied by the short-, intermediate-, and long-run models. The short-run halibut quotas
never exceed the actual halibut catches in any fishery, due to the effort constraints
on the existing fleet. Long-run quotas may exceed the actual catch because this
model permits structural adjustment in the fleet towards greater representation of
operations with high quasirents, which could also be accompanied by higher-than-
average halibut bycatch.
The aggregate halibut quotas for 1992 derived by comparing the point estimates
of bycatch opportunity cost with marginal value of halibut are similar in magnitude
for the short-run, long-run, and intermediate-run models, each being within 200 mt
of the actual catch of 4,362 mt. However, within these totals there was a marked
shift of halibut quota in the long-run solution, away from the Pacific cod fishery (for
both longline and trawl gear) and toward the pollock trawl fisheries, both in
midwater and on bottom. This partly reflects the fact that some Pacific cod opera-
tions, particularly longline catcher-processors, fished very cleanly with little halibut
bycatch. This allowed some midwater trawlers for pollock in the pelagic fishery that
Table 5
Quasirents and Participation in the Major
1992 Actual and Simulated Groundfish Fisheries
1992 Actual SR Model IR Model LR Model
Total Quasirents Total Quasirents Total Quasirents Total Quasirents
Target Fishery Processor Weeks Processor Weeks Processor Weeks Processor Weeks
Pollock Pelagic 200,864,593 201,314,777 201,704,055 246,850,134
449 436 436 480
Pollock Bottom 62,247,309 62,392,969 62,629,812 90,097,120
235 231 230 155
Pacific Cod 39,223,574 40,995,969 41,238,553 69,371,598
1,449 1,211 1,208 821
Rock Sole 20,024,403 19,869,616 19,928,490 26,756,206
135 130 130 131
Yellowfin Sole 24,168,922 24,386,731 24,455,911 32,478,825
508 483 484 624
Rockfish 7,588,023 7,548,014 7,516,464 3,857,437
77 72 72 98
Atka Mackerel 22,915,550 22,753,748 22,850,644 34,087,954
113 110 110 106
All BSAI 377,363,117 380,615,734 381,663,564 503,183,584
Groundfish 3,136 2,741 2,739 2,475Larson, House, and Terry 198
had high quasirents, but also higher-than-average halibut bycatch to participate in the
long-run solution. Though trawl halibut bycatch is larger in the long-run solution, the
per-mt bycatch rates remain low because the volumes of pollock harvested are large.
The reason for the similarity of the overall halibut quotas using point estimates
of opportunity cost can be seen partly in figure 1. The long-run model optimized by
catching the TACs of all species except arrowtooth flounder with a total halibut catch of
some 1,940 mt. Quotas of halibut beyond this level allowed for continued trawl harvest
of arrowtooth, which is plentiful in the BSAI and not currently quota-constrained,
with nearly-constant marginal value and relatively high halibut bycatch rates.
When the high estimate of marginal opportunity cost is used, the efficient quo-
tas do not change much in the short-run and intermediate-run models, because the
marginal value of halibut increases rapidly as halibut quota decreases. In the long-
run model, the efficient halibut quota is considerably less (1,940 mt), because for
quotas exceeding this level, the marginal value of halibut to the arrowtooth flounder
fishery is less than its opportunity cost. In the interest of brevity these results are not
presented separately.
Table 7 summarizes the efficient halibut quotas and corresponding catch of
other prohibited species. The long-run model indicates relatively little change in
halibut, herring, and crab bycatch, with substantial increase in chinook bycatch and
a large decrease in other salmon bycatch.
One inherent limitation of setting fixed catch quotas is illustrated by the simula-
tion results. Because the domestic BSAI groundfish fisheries are dynamic and con-
tinuing to develop in major new directions, with significant changes in effort and
participation in individual fisheries that are driven by biological conditions, mar-
kets, and regulatory changes, the efficient quotas can vary widely from fishery to
Table 6
Actual 1992 Halibut Bycatch in the BSAI Groundfish
Fisheries and Simulated Quotas, by Target Fishery and Gear
Target Target
Catch/Quota Fishery Lgline Pot Trawl Total Fishery Lgline Pot Trawl Total
1992 Actual Pollock 0 0 525 525 Rockfish 0 0 131 131
SR Quota Pelagic 0 0 525 525 0 0 131 131
IR Quota 0 0 536 536 0 0 131 131
LR Quota 0 0 1,828 1,828 0 0 117 117
1992 Actual Pollock 0 0 637 637 Atka 0 0 74 74
SR Quota Bottom 0 0 635 635 Mackerel 0 0 73 73
IR Quota 0 0 638 638 0 0 73 73
LR Quota 0 0 904 904 0 0 11 11
1992 Actual Pacific 1,491 3 387 1,881 Sablefish 26 0 0 26
SR Quota Cod 1,365 3 376 1,744 10 0 0 10
IR Quota 1,357 3 374 1,734 10 0 0 10
LR Quota 384 0 150 534 0 0 0 0
1992 Actual Rock 0 0 536 536 All BSAI 1,519 3 2,840 4,362
SR Quota Sole 0 0 533 533 Groundfish 1,378 3 2,818 4,198
IR Quota 0 0 533 533 1,369 3 2,827 4,199
LR Quota 0 0 424 424 384 0 3,862 4,246
1992 Actual Yellowfin 0 0 524 524
SR Quota Sole 0 0 518 518
IR Quota 0 0 518 518
LR Quota 0 0 419 419Toward Efficient Multispecies Bycatch 199
fishery over time. Because it is difficult for managers to anticipate these shifts in ef-
fort and participation, setting fixed quotas for fisheries may involve substantial inef-
ficiencies relative to institutions that can better accommodate these changing condi-
tions, such as tradeable individual catch quotas or revenue-neutral bycatch fees.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed and implemented a mathematical programming approach
to the rational setting of bycatch quotas in a multi-species fishery with multiple fish-
ing fleets using gear of differing selectivity. The model uses data commonly avail-
able to fisheries management agencies and operates at a highly disaggregated level
by optimizing on an individual operation-week basis. It is intended to simulate the
efficient fishery, in the sense of contributing the most to net social benefits from the
fishery, which are private quasirents to the groundfish fishery less the external costs
of bycatch. When it is optimized subject to constraints on total catch, the shadow
values on those constraints provide indications of the marginal values of each spe-
cies to the groundfish fishery.
The particular policy tool of interest here is halibut bycatch quotas, because
halibut is a high-valued species prized by commercial target and recreational fisher-
ies and is the bycatch species of greatest concern in the BSAI groundfish fishery. By
Table 7
Halibut Quotas and Catches of Other Prohibited Species by
Gear in the 1992 Actual and Simulated BSAI Groundfish Fisheries
Fishery Halibut Herring Bairdi Red KC Chinook OSalmon
Actual Catches
Longline 1,519 0 21,038 3,093 48 116
Pot 3 0 60,698 77 0 0
Trawl 2,840 378 3,710,707 154,287 23,895 3,406
Total 4,362 378 3,792,443 157,457 23,943 3,522
Short Run Fishery Simulation
Longline 1,378 0 20,190 1,887 47 102
Pot 3 0 57,280 64 0 0
Trawl 2,818 368 3,697,790 152,443 23,644 3,366
Total 4,198 368 3,775,260 154,395 23,691 3,469
Intermediate Run Model
Longline 1,369 0 20,302 1,874 46 102
Pot 3 0 56,791 64 0 0
Trawl 2,827 368 3,698,552 152,569 23,781 3,342
Total 4,199 368 3,775,645 154,507 23,827 3,444
Long Run Fishery Simulation
Longline 384 0 33,307 412 0 42
P o t 00 0 0 00
Trawl 3,862 336 3,786,960 167,136 39,713 574
Total 4,246 336 3,820,267 167,548 39,713 617Larson, House, and Terry 200
solving the model repeatedly for different management-specified aggregate halibut
quotas, the resulting marginal values of halibut in the groundfish fishery can be
compared with best estimates of the opportunity costs foregone by other fisheries
which target halibut and the other bycatch species. This leads in principle to a deter-
mination of the “efficient” quotas which equate marginal value to marginal opportu-
nity cost. This determination is done nonparametrically, interpolating the changes in
marginal values obtained for discrete quota changes.
A number of uncertainties plague empirical fisheries analysis, and this paper at-
tempted to account for some of them on both the demand and supply side. Both a
short-run and a long-run model of the groundfish industry response to changing
halibut quotas (with all other species quotas fixed at their actual levels for 1992)
were formulated and run. They differ in the degree of replication which is permitted
for the most efficient (highest quasirent) weeks: in the short-run model the only re-
sponse possible to restricting halibut quotas is to reduce effort, while in the long-run
model the entire yearly fishing pattern of any vessel can be replicated without re-
striction. These two formulations plausibly bound the range of marginal values of
halibut that might be induced by changes in the halibut quota policy tool.
Similar uncertainties exist with assessing the opportunity cost of bycatch. The
standard methodology used for their assessment, which in this paper is applied to
the six principal bycatch species associated with the BSAI groundfish fishery, is the
product of wholesale market price, the marginal change in bycatch per unit of hali-
but quota, and a scale factor converting gross catch to net wholesale product. Using
data on the variances and covariances of wholesale market prices, along with similar
information on the marginal bycatch per unit of halibut quota, an estimate of the
standard error of the opportunity cost of bycatch was made. From this, high and low
estimates of the opportunity cost of bycatch were constructed as the point estimate
plus or minus two standard errors.
When applied to data from the 1992 catcher-processor fleet which represents the
large majority of catch in the BSAI groundfish fishery, the comparison of point esti-
mates of marginal value and marginal opportunity cost suggested slightly lower
halibut quotas would have been efficient, with most of the reductions applied to the
longline fleet, but these “efficient” quotas were within 200 mt of the actual 1992
halibut catch of approximately 4,200 mt. Within these totals, the long-run model so-
lution had substantially higher halibut bycatch in trawl pollock fisheries and lower
bycatch in longline and trawl Pacific cod fisheries. This was accompanied by in-
creases in chinook salmon bycatch and decreases in other salmon bycatch, with her-
ring and crab bycatch levels unchanged. When the high estimate of marginal oppor-
tunity cost was used, the long-run model simulations suggested that efficient quotas
might be as low as 2,000 mt, a decrease of some 50%. The short-run model indi-
cated only slight reductions in halibut quota would be appropriate, as did an inter-
mediate-run model constructed as the mean of the two extremes. The long-run
model probably overstates fleet flexibility to respond to changing quotas, while the
short-run model probably understates it.
The structure and performance of the simulated long-run fishery at the efficient
halibut quota involved a somewhat lower fleet size, 107 vessels, compared to the ac-
tual 1992 fleet size of 130 operations. The maximum number of operations in any
given week was comparable, 107 in the long-run solution and 100 in the actual 1992
fishery. Effort was shifted toward the first three months of the year, and simulated
quasirents were some 30% to 40% higher than quasirents in the actual fishery. The
simulated structure and performance of the short-run fishery with efficient halibut
quotas paralleled the actual fishery with effort levels reduced.
These and other results from the bycatch programming models should be
viewed as primarily illustrative in nature, and they may be useful as one source ofToward Efficient Multispecies Bycatch 201
information about the complex problem of quota-setting in multispecies fisheries.
The advantages it offers include the fact that it offers some insight into the nature of
the tradeoffs which may be involved in changing quotas. It runs quickly and is easy
to modify for changing management objectives, so it can potentially be used as a
real-time management tool. Its structure is compatible with the goals of many mod-
ern fisheries economic policy analyses, whose purpose is to assess changes in social
welfare induced by policy tools such as aggregate quotas. However, it is restrictive
in a number of ways and shares limitations inherent with programming approaches
to fishery management. Some limitations are related to the extent and quality of in-
formation, particularly on costs of fishing, which is a difficult problem to surmount
regardless of the analytical approach used. A limitation inherent to the programming
approach is that the fishing technology is assumed to be essentially a Leontief pro-
cess, so behavioral choices by fishermen, such as substitution among areas or times
of the year, and changes in catch rates with fleet movements are not explicitly ad-
dressed. The results are also conditional on the existing level of stock abundance,
technical production possibilities, and prevailing product and factor prices in both
the groundfish and prohibited species fisheries.
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